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Balancing Administrative Efficiency and Fairness:
Restrictions on Local Hearing Advisors Post-Nightlife
Partners, Ltd. v. City of Beverly Hills
By Kelli Shope*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine this: you own a successful local tavern, with an
impeccable track record for adherence to city codes, and the city
denies the application to renew your liquor license. The Assistant
City Attorney, smug, explains that your application was incomplete,
the deadline has expired, and the city will not reconsider under any
circumstances. You promptly request a hearing and, in the
meantime, learn that the city has been planning to oust every
"morally bankrupt" institution in your neighborhood. Eager to
present your case to a neutral hearing officer, you approach your
hearing with optimism. The hearing officer introduces himself, a
self-proclaimed "first-timer," and announces the advisor who will be
assisting him throughout the process. In a fleeting moment, your
optimism disappears; your old friend, the City Attorney, is now
advising this first time hearing officer.
Could it be that an individual who advocated for the denial of
your license renewal is allowed to serve at your so-called fair hearing
as the decision-maker's advisor? Is the guarantee of a fair hearing
compromised by this apparent impartiality? You cannot help but
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wonder whether a few additional administrative safeguards would
protect your right to a fair hearing. Logic follows that additional
administrative protections would undoubtedly offer assurances of
fairness; but logic fails to account for the competing demands of
efficiency and fairness at the local level.
The longstanding concern over the combination of functions in
local adjudication provides the context of Nightlife Partners, Ltd. v.
City of Beverly Hills ("Nightlife").1 The Nightlife decision sends a
strong message regarding minimum due process procedures in local
adjudication and the applicability of the separation of functions
doctrine to local hearing advisors. 2
This note examines the Nightlife decision and its relevance to
administrative adjudication at the local level. Section II explores the
historical roots of the legal principles relevant to the Nightlife
decision. Section III sets forth the facts of the case and analyzes the
opinion, emphasizing the basis of support for the court's decision. In
Section IV, the probable impact of Nightlife on administrative law in
California and beyond will be discussed. Part V concludes the
discussion of Nightlife and the constitutional issues related to the
separation of functions doctrine.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Due Process in Administrative Adjudication
The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution sets forth the guarantee of basic fairness before a
tribunal for all citizens. Although the exact contours of the clause
remain fluid and contextual, "due process is a hallmark of the
American legal system.",4 At its threshold, the Supreme Court has
1. Nightlife Partners, Ltd. v. City of Beverly Hills, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003).
2. See id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The pertinent text of the Fifth Amendment provides
that no citizen shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . ." Id. The Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment: "No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
4. JUDGE HAROLD E. KAHN & ROBERT D. LINKS, ESQ., CALIFORNIA CIVIL
PRACTICE § 7.27 (2003).
recognized that "a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of
due process."' Although due process originally and primarily applied
to the judicial court system, its applicability to administrative
proceedings has been clearly established.6 Accordingly, for an
administrative proceeding to comport with minimum due process
requirements, an impartial, unbiased decision-maker is fundamental.7
A less definitive issue, and one of ongoing controversy, is the
inherent appearance of unfairness in the routine combination of
investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions within a
single governmental unit in administrative law; an even more
controversial scenario arises when the combination of these functions
lies in the job description of a single governmental employee.8 In
5. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
6. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1954); Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). However, procedures required in courts under due
process are different than those required in the administrative context. KAHN,
supra note 4, § 7.27. "There is a vast difference between the due process required
in administrative hearings as opposed to formal court trials." Id. For instance, in
the formal court system, the independence of judges is of utmost concern while in
the administrative context, it is not necessarily a due process violation for a
decision-maker to have participated in the investigation stage leading to the action.
Id.
7. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271 (stating that "an impartial decision maker is
essential.").
8. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 51 (1975). "The issue is substantial, it is
not new ... and [those] concerned with the operations of administrative agencies
have given much attention to whether and to what extent distinctive administrative
functions should be performed by the same persons. No single answer has been
reached." Id. The combination of investigatory, prosecutorial, and adjudicative
functions, the "hallmark" of administrative law, has historically raised due process
concerns particularly related to bias and conflict of interest. See ALFRED C. AMAN,
JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.1, at 200, § 8.5.4, at 247-48
(1998) [hereinafter AMAN & MAYTON]. "Whether an independent and impartial
adjudication is possible in such an environment of combined power has been a
long-standing concern of administrative law." Id. § 5.2.2, at 133 (citing Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950)). In his article on evolving statutory
protections for regulated parties, Michael Asimow effectively depicts the
challenges inherent in the combination of functions:
A historic administrative law dilemma concerns the combination
of conflicting functions within the same agency. Many agencies
adopt regulations, investigate violations of statute or regulations,
prosecute alleged violators, adjudicate the issue of whether a
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local administrative adjudication, challenges based on this system
allowing for the combination of functions are subject to review under
due process; 9 the following summarizes the history of the separation
of functions doctrine and related due process considerations.
B. Separation of Functions
As a natural consequence of limited resources in local
government, administrative procedures at the local level have
traditionally been relaxed and often scrutinized.' 0 Of notable concern
violation occurred and prescribe the appropriate penalty.
Combining all these functions in the same agency may well serve
the causes of efficiency and accuracy, but regulated parties
generally find the combination unfair and objectionable.
Michael Asimow, The Influence of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act on
California's New Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 297, 314 (Winter
1996).
Presidential Committees and Congress throughout the last century have had
various solutions and recommendations aimed at ensuring judicial independence
and fairness. See AMAN & MAYTON, § 5.2.2 at 133-34. Recommendations include
complete separation of the judicial function whereby a neutral body would take
over in the decision-making phase. Id. at 133. Many presidential commissions
have suggested that the judicial function be entirely taken away from agencies. Id.
at 134. This structure has been justified, however, by the primary goals of
administrative law: efficiency and effectiveness. Id. § 8.5.4, at 247. Instead of
stripping agencies of their adjudicative function, Congress has responded to the
combination of functions concern through an "internal separation of functions" as
dictated by adjudicative safeguards found within the Administrative Procedure Act.
Id. § 5.2.2, at 134. "The case law, both federal and state, generally rejects the idea
that the combination [of] judging [and] investigating functions is a denial of due
process .... " MICHAEL ASIMOW, ET.AL., STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW § 3.3, at 120 (2d ed. 1998) (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 52) [hereinafter
"As imow, STATE AND FEDERAL"].
9. Michael Asimow, News From the States: Due Process and the Choice of a
Local Government Hearing Officer, 24 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 9 (Spring 1999).
10. Courts have implied that questionable procedures at the local level are
inexcusable considering the vast number of proceedings at that level and
consequently the number of individuals affected by the outcomes of these
proceedings. See e.g., Nightlife Partners, Ltd. v. City of Beverly Hills, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 234, 242-43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). The Supreme Court has approached the
issue from a practicality standpoint; it validated concerns about the combination of
functions but concluded that "the variety and complexity of administrative
processes defies simple doctrinaire solution." See CHARLES H. KOCH JR., ADMIN.
L. & PRAC., § 6.11 (2d ed. 2003).
is the lenient combination of functions and the ensuing appearance of
unfairness in local proceedings." Admittedly, the combination of
functions "carries a risk that the decision will be biased," but
practical complexities of administrative law have required that the
otherwise efficient structure remain intact.1 2 In Withrow v. Larkin,
the leading case on due process considerations related to the
combination of functions, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the administrative structure which combines
functions within an administrative unit and held that the mere
combination of investigative and adjudicative functions in
administrative proceedings, absent actual bias,13 does not violate due
process.14 Further, a due process challenge based on the separation
of functions doctrine must "overcome a presumption of honesty and
integrity in those serving as adjudicators ... ."15 The ruling allowed
for some discretion, however, where a court determines in "the
special facts and circumstances present in the case before it that the
risk of unfairness is intolerably high."' 16  This judicial discretion
appears to align with an historical, flexible notion of due process as
presented by Justice Frankfurter: due process, "unlike some legal
11. Asimow, supra note 9. "Local adjudication is the black hole of
administrative law. Local agencies can generally select any procedure they want to
use, subject only to due process requirements." Id. at 9. As a consequence, parties
involved in local adjudication rarely have successful challenges against the process
in their administrative proceeding. Id.
12. KOCH, supra note 10, § 6.11.
13. The showing of actual bias pertains to challenges based on separation of
functions, however those seeking to remove hearing officers for pecuniary interest
need not establish actual bias. See Haas v. County of San Bernardino, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 341 (Cal. 2002). "While adjudicators challenged for reasons other than
financial interest have in effect been afforded a presumption of impartiality,
adjudicators challenged for financial interest have not." Id. at 347 (citing Withrow,
421 U.S. at at 47; Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986)).
14. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). See also JOANNE
CONSTANTINO, ET. AL, 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law § 313. The Court has
consistently upheld the constitutionality of the administrative law structure. Id.
Withrow validated the combination of investigative and adjudicatory functions
within a single agency, but a more "alarming" combination may be that of the
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 8, at
248.
15. Withrow, 421 U.S. at47.
16. Id. at 58.
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rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances . . . 'due process' is compounded of
history, reason, the past course of decisions and stout confidence in
the strength of the democratic faith which we profess . "..."17 Still,
the sentiment of Withrow is that, generally speaking, "[d]ue process
violations must turn on 'a risk of actual bias or prejudgment ' "18
where separation of functions challenges question the
constitutionality of agency structure.' 9
Building on the holding of Withrow, some states have granted
plaintiffs additional protection, such as allowing for an "appearance
of bias" standard.2 ° In 1981, California's leading case on bias
required a showing of actual bias for successful due process
challenges; 21 the plurality explained that "a party's unilateral
perception of an appearance of bias cannot be a ground for
disqualification [of a hearing officer] unless we are ready to tolerate a
system in which disgruntled or dilatory litigants can wreak havoc
with the orderly administration of dispute-resolving tribunals. '22
However a decision in 2002 established that, at least in some
circumstances, an appearance of bias is sufficient grounds for a bias
17. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63
(1951) (concurring opinion).
18. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 8, at 249 (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47).
19. Id.
20. AsIMow, STATE AND FEDERAL, supra note 8, at 120.
21. Asimow, supra note 9. See also Andrews v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd.,
171 Cal. Rptr. 590 (Cal. 1981) (holding actual bias was required to invalidate a
hearing officer's decision.). The dissent in Andrews argued that an appearance of
bias standard would more adequately protect the due process rights of aggrieved
parties. Id. at 601 (Clark, J. dissenting). Justice Clark argued that "the appearance
of bias ... is not only a sufficient but a compelling ground for disqualification ...
[and the standard] is essential to the stability of the adjudicative process . . ."
because it protects the petitioner's right to a fair hearing and the integrity of the
administrative system is validated. Id. Clark was one step ahead in recognizing the
"invisible influence" of bias and pleaded: "[I]s it not better to err on the side of
justice rather than to impose the risk that in an instance of actual but unprovable
bias the prejudiced party will be without remedy?" Id. at 602. Judicial ears may
have listened to Clark; in 2002, the California Supreme Court applied an
appearance of bias standard in striking down a county's hearing officer selection
process. See Haas v. County of San Bernardino, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341 (Cal. 2002).
22. Andrews, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 590, 596.
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claim.23 Haas v. County of San Bernardino broadened the scope of
challenges based on bias; the California Supreme Court held that
when the County was permitted to hire the presiding hearing officer,
the plaintiff was deprived of due process.24 The hearing officer had
never met the plaintiff or counsel representing the county, and there
was no indication that she was biased in any regard.25  An
administrative scholar commented that the Haas decision provided
"rare and valuable protection for parties embroiled in local
government adjudication ' 26 in light of Andrews and the traditional
deference afforded to local governments' selection of procedures.27
Courts have also been more willing to accept a less exacting
measure of bias where an individual employee within an agency
performs conflicting tasks. 28 Serious due process issues arise when
the same individual serves in dual functions in the same
proceeding.29 States have afforded additional protections including
the broader showing of an appearance of bias. 30 In Walker v. City of
Berkeley,31 the ninth circuit relied on and narrowed the Withrow
ruling, holding that the City of Berkeley's combination of functions
violated the plaintiff's due process rights by allowing the same
individual to serve simultaneously as advocate for one party and
23. See generally Asimow, supra note 9. See also Haas, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
341.
24. See Haas, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341. In Haas, a business owner defended
against license revocation by the county. Id. The prosecutor for the county chose
the hearing officer presiding over the hearing. Id. Haas argued that he was denied
due process when those pushing for revocation were allowed to select the decision-
maker. Id. The hearing officer was a first time hearing officer and had never met
either party. Despite an absence of any showing of bias on the part of the decision-
maker, the court held that Haas was denied due process of law. Id. The impact
Haas left for local governments is the requirement that permanent hearing officers
must be hired, or at minimum, someone other than an advocate involved in a
dispute must select the decision-maker. See id.; Asimow, supra note 9, at 9.
Essentially, "due process constrains the county's choice of a hearing officer." Id.
25. Haas, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341.
26. Asimow, supra note 9 at 9.
27. Id.
28. ASIMow, STATE AND FEDERAL, supra note 8, at 118.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 120.
31. Walker v. City of Berkeley, 951 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1991).
Spring 2004
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decision-maker in the same matter.32  The court affirmed the
constitutionality of agency structure but contended that Withrow
distinguished the scenario where the same employee within the
agency performs conflicting functions.33 As such, in Walker, "the
fatal defect was in allowing the same person to serve both as decision
maker and as advocate for the party that benefited from the
decision." 34 Here, the ninth circuit officially recognized and carved
out different standards for individual versus structural bias.35
Many states have afforded constitutional protections beyond
those in Walker by precluding an advocate for one party from serving
as the hearing advisor in the same or factually related proceeding.
36
In California, relatively few cases have considered the separation of
functions doctrine as applied to the role of hearing advisor, and,
among those, courts have reached varying outcomes. 7 A notable
California case flatly rejected the applicability of the separation of
functions doctrine to hearing advisors serving in other capacities.
38
The court reasoned that a lawyer representing one side could advise
the decision-making body because "by the very nature of the
administrative process the agency or one of its agents or
representatives is bound to be involved in the initiation and
prosecution of charges." 39 Howitt v. Superior Court4° marked a shift
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 185.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., People ex rel. Woodard v. Brown, 770 P.2d 1373 (Colo. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that due process precludes an advocate from advising the decision-
making body in the same matter).
37. See B.E. WITKIN ET AL., WITKIN SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 527 at
397 (9th ed. 2003) (citing Chosick v. Reilly, 270 P.2d 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954);
Ford v. Civil Serv. Comm. of Los Angeles, 327 P.2d 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958)).
38. Greer v. Bd. of Educ., 121 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). See also
Ford, 327 P.2d at 148; Chosick, 270 P.2d at 547.
39. Greer, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 556. This statement reflects the historically
lenient standards allowable at the local level. One year later, however, a California
court faced a similar case and an opposite holding. In Midstate Theatres Inc. v.
County of Stanislaus, the court held that a lawyer could not represent one party and
advise the hearing officer in the same proceeding. 128 Cal. Rptr. 54 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976). The court relied on a statute in its ruling but also on due process principles.
Id.
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of sorts in California; the court considered whether due process
precluded an advocate for the County from serving as the hearing
officer's advisor in the same proceeding against a county deputy.41
The court held that an advocate from the county counsel office could
advise the decision-maker so long as adequate screening procedures
prevent that advisor from inappropriate communications with the
county advocate serving in a prosecutorial function at the
proceeding.42 In other words, under Howitt, an attorney advocating
for one party would be precluded from advising the hearing officer in
the same proceeding.43
C. Statutory Protections: The Role of the APA
State and federal Administrative Procedure Acts offer additional
protections in adjudication beyond the minimum constitutional
safeguards.44 For instance, the federal APA places stricter burdens
40. In Howitt v. Superior Court, a county deputy sheriff was suspended for
inappropriate conduct and transferred by the sheriff's department. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d
196 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). The plaintiff sought review to determine whether the
deputy city counsel representing county could serve as the decision-making board's
advisor in the same proceeding. Id.
41. Prior to the decision in Withrow, upholding the administrative structure,
two cases addressed separation of functions as applied to hearing advisors. See
Chosick, 125 Cal.App.2d 547 (holding that the Board did not violate individual's
due process rights by having prosecution staff assist Board in decision-making);
see also Ford, 161 Cal.App.2d 692, 697 (holding that staff from county counsel's
office opposing the plaintiff could serve as advisor to the decision-maker because
there -was "no evidence that the deputy county counsel who advised the
commission did anything other than that which was wholly proper.") The court in
Ford went on to state that "under our law, the administrative agency can even be
both the prosecutor and judge in the same manner." Ford, 161 Cal. App. 2d at 697.
42. Howitt, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 196.
43. Id.
44. The federal APA was established in 1946 as a means of addressing agency
structure and its potential for conflicts of interest and impartiality in decision-
making. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 8, at 200. The provisions dealing with the
separation of functions, Sections 554, 556 and 557, attempt to "establish at least a
modicum of judicial independence on the part of the ALJs who hear cases at the
trial level of the agency proceedings." Id. at 202. However, these protections are
only triggered when specific language requiring formal APA procedures is clearly
found in the agency's Enabling Act. Id. at 202-03. If the language "on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing" is not within the Act, §§554, 556 and 557
Spring 2004
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on agency procedure; despite the constitutionality of agency
structure, the APA mandates internal separation of functions to
prevent bias and promote judicial independence. 45  The APA
provides that "while agencies may perform a variety of functions,
individual employees may not."46 More specifically, under section
554(d), an agency employee engaged in investigatory and
prosecutorial tasks is prohibited from serving as a decision-maker or
even advising a decision-maker in the same case.47
D. The Interrelation Between Statutory and Constitutional
Protections
Two Supreme Court cases examine the interrelation between
procedures required under Due Process and those required by the
do not apply to the adjudication. Id. The protections also do not apply to
administrative proceedings at the local level.
At the state level, the Model State Administrative Procedure Act provides
additional protections for agency adjudications. ASIMOW, STATE AND FEDERAL,
supra note 8, § 3.1.2, at 93. Although only a few states have adopted the MSAPA
in its entirety, most states have created their own similar Acts, partly based on the
MSAPA. Id., § 3.1, at 83-84. To get a sense of protections offered by states,
MSAPA § 4-214 provides the following regarding separation of functions:
A person who has served as investigator, prosecutor or advocate
in an adjudicative proceeding or in its pre-adjudicative stage may
not serve as presiding officer or assist or advise a presiding
officer in the same proceeding. A person who is subject to the
authority, direction, or discretion of one who has served as
investigator, prosecutor or advocate in an adjudicative
proceeding or in its pre-adjudicative stage may not serve as
presiding officer or assist or advise a presiding officer in the
same proceeding.
AsIMow, STATE AND FEDERAL, supra note 8, at 760.
45. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 8, at 248. The APA has adopted a system
of internal separation of functions to avoid bias or the appearance of bias. Id. at
200. Further, the APA requires the use of Administrative Law Judges in formal
hearings to prevent judicial influence. id. § 8.5.2, at 242-44.
46. Id. at 248.
47. Id. at 248. See also 5 U.S.C. § 554 (d) (West, WESTLAW through 2004
legislation). "An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or
prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related
case, participate or advise in the decisions, recommended decision, or agency
review ... ." Id.
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APA. In Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, the Court faced the issue of
whether the APA's formal adjudication requirements were triggered
in the context of a deportation hearing. 48 In an atypical decision, the
Court held that the APA's formal procedures were required despite
the absence of language triggering the procedures in the Immigration
Act.49 Effectively, this decision interpreted the APA's requirement
of formal procedures "in every case required by statute to be
determined on the record" 50 as encompassing the Constitution in
addition to Enabling Acts. 51 The Court "erroneously equated the
procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause with those set
forth in the APA. ' '52  As such, the minimum procedures were
insufficient since they did not meet the requirements set forth in the
APA While this holding was only applicable in the immigration
context, it led to an examination of the relationship between due
process and the APA.54
Five years later, the Court revisited the implications of Wong
Yang Sung in Marcello v. Bonds, another case involving deportation
in which an alien argued that formal APA requirements were
required and not followed in his case. Justice Clark took this
opportunity to reject Wong Yang Sung and clarify that "[s]imply
because the Constitution may require a hearing does not mean that
48. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). See also AMAN &
MAYTON, supra note 8, at 203. The government contended that the APA
requirements did not apply because they were not specifically called for in the
Immigration Act of 1917. Id. It further argued that although the hearing did not
adhere to the APA procedures, the procedures met due process standards. Id.
However, the court sided with the plaintiff, holding that due process clearly
required a hearing. Id.
49. Id.
50. 5 U.S.C § 554 (a) (West, WESTLAW through 2004 legislation).
51. Id.; AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 8, at 203.
52. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 8, at 203.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 204. As a result of Wong Yang Sung, "there was a constitutional
basis for a formal APA adjudicatory hearing ...." Id. This broad interpretation of
APA §554 (a) was ultimately rejected by the Court. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349
U.S. 302 (1955).
55. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955). See also AMAN & MAYTON,
supra note 8, at 204.
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this hearing must be an APA adjudicatory hearing., 56  In other
words, the Court recognized that due process requirements are
"separate and distinct from the statutory procedural requirements of
the APA. ' 57  Due process represents the "constitutional floor" of
procedures required; statutes including the APA provide additional
protections for parties involved in adjudication, with the exception of
local adjudication where claimants may only resort to the protections
afforded under due process. 58
While state and federal Administrative Procedure Acts were
adopted to supplement threshold due process requirements as applied
to state and federal agencies, the APAs do not apply to administrative
proceedings at the local level. 59 Due process review governs local
administrative adjudications and "authorizes a much broader
combination of functions than does the APA. ''6° Generally, due
process under the federal constitution sets forth guidelines for local
administrative action, although due process under state constitutions
may afford additional protections beyond those granted federally.61
In reality, due process affords little protection for parties engaged in
disputes before local administrative bodies. 62 But, as disenchanted
parties continue to challenge local procedure, little by little the
contours of due process are revealed and refined.
56. Id. at 205.
57. Id. at 204. See also Marcello, 349 U.S. 302.
58. AsIMow, STATE AND FEDERAL, supra note 8, at 83.
59. Id. The APA exempts agency heads from this restriction, however the
Model State APA contains no such exemption. Id. at 122.
60. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 8, at 249. Adjudication at the local level
has been called the "black hole of administrative law." Asimow, supra note 9.
Local government can choose any procedure, restricted only by due process. Id.
61. ASIMOW, STATE AND FEDERAL, supra note 8, § 2, at 18 ("State
constitutions also provide for due process and may provide greater (but not lesser)
protection than the federal Constitution"); see also Lyness v. State Bd. of Med.,
605 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 1992). In Pennsylvania, the State granted protections beyond
those under Withrow holding that agency heads may not engage in prosecutorial
and decision-making functions. See id. And, in Colorado, due process "precludes
counsel who performs as an advocate in a given case from advising the decision-
making body in the same case." Woodard v. Brown 770 P.2d 1373, 1376 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1989) (citing Weissman v. Bd. of Ed., 547 P.2d 1267 (Colo. 1976)).
62. KOCH, supra note 10.
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III. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
A. Nightlife Partners: The Facts
The operators of an adult cabaret (collectively "Petitioners") in
Beverly Hills, California sought to renew their permit pursuant to the
city's municipal code.63 Petitioners initially faced obstacles getting
the appropriate forms from the city but ultimately turned in their
application on time.64 City of Beverly Hills ("City") reviewed the
application, and City's Assistant Attorney Terrence Boga determined
that it was incomplete. 65  City, through Boga and official letters,
informed Petitioners that renewal applicants were required to submit
the same documents as those required for initial permit
applications.66 Petitioners argued that the additional requirement was
absent from the municipal code and from the application itself.67
Regardless, City's finance director denied the permit renewal
application based on incompleteness and informed the company that
the renewal would have failed anyway due to noncompliance with
design and performance standards in the city's code.68 Petitioners
requested and received an administrative hearing to review the
decision to deny their permit renewal. 69 The administrative appeal
process granted to the cabaret owners was the basis for the ensuing
appeal.70
63. Nightlife Partners, Ltd. v. City of Beverly Hills, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 237
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003). Petitioners include: Nightlife Partners Ltd.; Entertainment
Associates of L.A., Inc.; Deja Vu Showgirls of Beverly Hills, LLC; and Deja Vu
Consulting Inc. Id. The municipal code required permit renewals every two years.
Id.
64. Id. at 238. Initially, Petitioners were told that there were no separate forms
for adult entertainment permit renewals. Id. Instead, City offered renewal forms
for "private clubs/public dancing." Id. This was the renewal form Petitioner
submitted to City, prior to the applicable deadline. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. Boga informed Petitioners that additional documents such as site plans
and letters were required. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 238.
69. Id.
70. Id. It is worth noting that "[a]t all times relevant to this appeal, Petitioners
and City were engaged in federal litigation.., related to City's regulation of adult
v_
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David Holmquist, City's risk manager and an attorney, served as
the hearing officer at Petitioner's administrative appeal.71 Holmquist
informed the parties that he had never before served in this capacity
and proceeded to introduce an individual charged with the duties of
advising and assisting; the hearing advisor was Terrence Boga, the
City Assistant Attorney involved in the initial decision to deny
Petitioner's renewal application. 72  The City had appointed an
attorney for the review of the denial,73 while Boga assisted the
hearing officer. 74 Throughout the proceeding, Holmquist and advisor
Boga discussed what appeared to be legal principles related to the
case.7 5  Among Holmquist's decisions were two major rulings in
affirming the City's denial of Petitioner's permit renewal: 1) the fact
that City provided forms without complete instructions detailing the
requirement of additional documents was irrelevant and 2) Nightlife
was not permitted to introduce evidence suggesting purposeful
discrimination by City toward adult businesses.
76
After Holmquist's decision to deny Petitioner's appeal, the
company petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate. 77  The
mandate urged: 1) that City set aside the denial of their permit and
2) that City approve the application for renewal.78 Petitioners
primarily alleged violations of procedural due process. 79 The petition
set forth the following allegations: 1) the administrative hearing was
generally unfair, 2) Holmquist wrongly decided evidentiary issues,
entertainment." Id. at 237 (citation omitted). Terrence Boga was among two
others listed as attorneys representing the City of Beverly Hills. Id.
71. Id. at 238.
72. Id.
73. Id. City's new attorney William Litvak had no prior involvement in this
matter. Id.
74. Id. Petitioners objected to the hearing officer's status as a city employee
and to the selection of Boga as the advisor. Id. Both challenges failed. Id.
75. Id. The reporter at the hearing did not transcribe the conversations between
the two. Id.
76. Id. Petitioners had wanted to show evidence indicating discrimination,
such as the fact that the only type of business subject to additional application
procedures was the adult entertainment business and that Petitioners are the only
business of this type in the city. Id.
77. Id. at 239.
78. Id.
79. Id.
and 3) hearing procedures violated Petitioner's due process rights.80
Holmquist argued, in response to the petition, that his opinion was
made independently, without the help of any city employee, and
denied that he was biased because of his role as City's risk
manager.8' Holmquist's opposition to the petition failed to address
Petitioner's contention that Boga advised and assisted with
determining legal matters and evidentiary issues at the hearing.
82
The reviewing trial court did not admit Holmquist's written
opposition, considering it inadmissible in an administrative review of
his decision. 83
The trial court held that Petitioner's procedural due process rights
were violated and that Boga's assistance during the administrative
review constituted actual bias. 84 The court ordered a new hearing. 85
City appealed the decision arguing that the court's finding of actual
bias was without merit.86 Further, it argued that Boga's role was
constitutionally and legally permissible and that Petitioner's hearing
met the due process standard of fairness.87
The California Court of Appeal limited the issue on appeal: the
court explained that the issue was whether the hearing comported
with minimum due process requirements, not whether the
circumstances surrounding the administrative appeal amounted to
actual bias.88
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. The court concluded that Boga took an active role in Petitioner's
application process and that, in a review of that process, Boga in fact advised and
assisted the hearing officer. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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B. Analysis
Justice Croskey delivered the opinion for the California Court of
Appeal. 89 He began the analysis by settling the only factual dispute
in the record- whether Boga actively assisted and served in an
advisory capacity during the proceeding. 90 The court noted City's
contention that the record does not detail any actual involvement but
took judicial notice of the fact that communications on legal issues
between hearing officers and staff are typically not reported.91
Further, Holmquist's own introduction of Boga, on the record, as an
assistant who would function as an advisor/assistant, was enough to
conclude that Boga did advise and assist.92 The court pointed out
that in Holmquist's opposition to Nightlife's petition, he omitted
reference to Boga's participation, suggesting that Boga did in fact
advise and assist during the proceeding. 93 The court disagreed with
the lower court regarding the admissibility of Holmquist's written
opposition; admission of extrinsic evidence is allowable where the
issue is whether an administrative hearing was fair and where the
independent judgment test applies. 94 For these reasons, the court
presumed that Boga did in fact advise and assist.95
The court proceeded to determine whether the administrative
hearing violated the petitioner's due process rights.96 Through
supportive caselaw, the court set forth the general rule that
procedural due process applies in administrative law 97 and requires,
at minimum, a "fair hearing before a neutral or unbiased decision-
maker." 98  Further, comparing administrative law proceedings to
judicial proceedings, the court explained that due process requires
89. Id. at 237.
90. Id. at 240.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 241. Here, both of these elements were met, therefore the court
admitted Holmquist's declaration. Id.
95. Id. at 240.
96. Id. at 242.
97. Id. (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
98. Id. (citing Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1997); Withrow v.
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975)).
"an appearance of fairness and the absence of even a probability of
outside influence on adjudication." 99 The court recognized that the
broad impact of administrative proceedings on the rights of countless
individuals and businesses necessitates the guarantee of fairness. 00
In the quest for fairness in administrative adjudications, hearing
officers are the "pivotal, first level of judicial review."101  To
demonstrate its concern over the significance of an impartial hearing
officer, the court referred to articles that examine the role of the
AU 10 2 and propose the adoption of a uniform code of conduct for
99. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 242, 243 (emphasis in original).
Interestingly, the court cites no sources for this contention. However, further in its
analysis, the court states that the basic tenet of the APA and the MSAPA is to
"promote both the appearance of fairness and the absence of even a probability of
outside influence on administrative hearings" through the separation of functions.
Id. at 243, (citing CONSTANTINO, supra note 14, § 313). The court's use of the
APAs as sources for what constitutes a fair hearing under due process was not
entirely persuasive; the acts do not apply to local hearings and the acts provide
more protection than the threshold due process requirements for a fair hearing.
100. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 243. See also W. Michael Gillette,
Administrative Law Judges, Judicial Independence, and Judicial Review: Qui
Custodiet lpsos Custodes, 20 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 95, 113 (2000)
(commenting on the importance of the administrative law judge and issues related
to judicial independence in the administrative setting. Gillette explains,
"[I]nescapably, administrative law and the administrative state impinge on the
public more and more often .... ).
101. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 243, (quoting Gillette, supra note 100 at
113). See also Patricia E. Salkin, Judging Ethics for Administrative Law Judges:
Adoption of a Uniform Code of Judicial Conduct for the Administrative Judiciary,
11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 7-8 & n 3 (2002) (advocating adoption of a uniform code of
conduct for all administrative judges within in each state)). See also Gillette, supra
note 100 at 95, 113. The court's emphasis on administrative law's increasingly
broad effect on citizens' lives, and inclusion of materials on reforming the
administrative judiciary, suggests a policy argument of which the court granted
credibility. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 243. The court conceded that Salkin's
article primarily pertains to state and not local hearing officers but suggested that
local agencies have the "same potential of impacting significant rights and of being
the first level of adjudicatory review." Id. The discussion related to judicial ethics
and a uniform code requirement seems to be slightly displaced and a questionable
source on which this court relies. Possibly presented as a corollary argument, it
likely represents a matter of policy of which the court considered persuasive and
relevant to a general discussion of bias and the underlying concern over judicial
independence.
102. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 243. See also GILLETTE, supra note 100 at
113; SALKIN, supra note 101 at 7-8 & n 3.
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administrative law judges. 10 3  The court also referred to an ABA
resolution urging local governments to mandate uniform procedures
for judiciary members in the field of administrative law. 10 4
The court then explored the impact of state and federal APAs on
local hearings. 10 5  It conceded that the APA does not apply to
administrative hearings at the local level but urged that the APA is
helpful insight into what the Legislature considers elements of fair
procedure in administrative proceedings.' 0 6  As such, the court
explained that, in attempt to address fairness concerns, the APA
103. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 243. In her article advocating statewide
judicial codes of ethics for ALJs, Patricia E. Salkin argued that concerns over
fairness in administrative law decision-making need to be put to rest once and for
all: "[a]fter almost a quarter of a century of attention to various aspects of ethical
considerations for ALJs, including independence, bias and ex parte
communications, it is time for all of the states to exercise leadership in adopting
statewide uniform codes of ethics for ALJs." Salkin, supra note 101 at 7. While
admitting that requiring court judges and hearing officers to adhere to the same
code of conduct is controversial, Salkin points out that administrative judges are
increasingly considered "'comparable in function to trial judges"'. Id. at 23
(quoting Karen S. Lewis, Administrative Law Judges and the Code of Judicial
Conduct: A Need For Regulated Ethics, 94 DICK L. REv. 929, 946 (1990)).
104. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 243; (citing Salkin, supra note 101, at 10).
The court refers to Resolution 1iB, approved at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Association, "urging state and local governments to require that
members of the administrative judiciary be accountable under provisions similar to
the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct." Id. In her article, Salkin pointed out
that the resolution would protect the public and give credibility to administrative
proceedings at all levels. SALKIN, supra note 101, at 10. Reference to a resolution
for administrative law judges seems to be overreaching since the case at issue
mainly involves the conflict of functions by a hearing advisor at the local level.
However, Salkin's article does suggest that a uniform code of ethics should apply
to administrative judges at the local level as well: "[t]he public deserves fair and
impartial hearings no matter who conducts them, and this resolution better ensures
that this will be a reality." Id. at 11.
105. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 243.
106. Id. (citing Tucker v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 245 P.2d 597 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1952)). Reliance on the APA as an indicator of what process is due under
the constitution is a curious choice by the court. First, the APA does not apply to
administrative proceedings at the local level. Id. As the Supreme Court held in
Marcello, the requirements of due process and the APA are separate and distinct.
Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 318-19. Further, due process requirements
generally amount to threshold requirements, with the APA stepping in to add
additional procedures for state and federal agencies beyond that which due process
requires. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 243.
mandates adequate separation of prosecutorial and adjudicatory
functions within an agency.'0 7  The court emphasized that the
separation of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions is of particular
concern and cited caselaw in support of the notion that counsel
advocating for a particular party is generally prohibited from
advising the decision-maker in the same case. 10 8 The federal APA,
the MSAPA, many state APAs, and California's APA prohibit an
individual involved in a prosecutorial capacity for an agency from
advising or participating in the decision-making process in the same
case.109 Further, the federal APA and California's APA prohibit an
employee engaged in a prosecutorial function from supervising or
directing a hearing officer." 0 Holmquist was in fact "subject to the
direction of Boga,"' indicating a violation under the California
APA model. 1 2 According to the court, another violation, under the
California APA, 113 occurred when the communications between the
two went unreported. 1 4  That the requirements and procedures
mandated by the various APAs do not apply to local hearings was
107. Id.
108. Id. at 244 (citing CONSTANTINO, supra note 14, § 313, fn. 57, 58. The
rule the court refers to derives from case law in Colorado and Pennsylvania. See
Shah v. State Bd. of Med., 589 A. 2d 783 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991); People ex. rel.
Woodard v. Brown, 770 P.2d 1373 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989). Also referenced by this
court is Rhee v. El Camino Hospital Dist. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 244
(citing Rhee v. El Camino Hosp. Dist., 247 Cal. Rptr. 244, 257 (Cal Ct. App.
1988)). Rhee supports the notion that due process prevents an advocate for one
party from serving as decision-maker in the same case. Id. However, unlike the
Colorado and Pennsylvania decisions, Rhee was not decided based on due process
procedures related to the role of advisor to the decision-maker. Rhee, 247 Cal.
Rptr. at 251-53.
109. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 244. See also 5 U.S.C § 554(d)(West,
WESTLAW through 2004 legislation); CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 11425.30 (West
2004).
110. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 244; see also 5 U.S.C § 554 (d)(2); CAL.
Gov'T. CODE § 11425.30.
111. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245 n 5.
112. Id. The court argues that as City's advocate, Boga was precluded from
advising, supervising or giving direction to Holmquist under this model. Id. n. 5.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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reiterated by the court." 5
The court went on to address relevant California case law
involving due process and the separation of functions doctrine. 16 In
Howitt v. Superior Court ("Howitt"), a deputy county counsel
representing the county at a hearing planned to advise the decision-
maker and prepare the written decision in the same hearing."17 The
court explained that county counsel was precluded from serving as
advisor to the hearing officer in the same matter.1 8 The court relied
on Howitt to establish the rule that in California it is "improper for
the same attorney who prosecutes the case to also serve as an adviser
115. Id. It should be noted that despite the court's analysis and attention to the
APA, it repeated that the state and federal APAs did not apply to this hearing. Id.
However, for not applying to the case at hand, the court allotted a great deal of its
analysis to the APA suggesting that it regarded the APA as influential.
116. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245. The sole California case the court
relied on in support of its holding was Howitt v. Superior Court. Id (citing Howitt
v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)). Prior to Howitt, few
cases dealt with the role of advisor and the separation of functions doctrine. See
Ford v. Civil Serv. Comm. of Los Angeles, 327 P.2d 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958);
Chosick v. Reilley, 270 P.2d 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954). No clear rule was
established or followed. WITKIN, supra note 37 § 527.
117. See Howitt, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 197-98.
118. Id. Howitt can be distinguished from the present case to some degree. In
Howitt, the county counsel was serving in an advocacy role at the same time as
serving an advisory function. Id. at 196. Here, an attorney from another firm was
appointed for the administrative appeal; in his prosecutorial capacity, Boga was
involved in the initial decision to deny the renewal. Boga was not advocate for
City while serving as advisor to the decision-maker. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
238-39. In fact, some argue that Boga's advocacy role was routine, limited, and
non-partisan- that he merely recommended that a petition be denied for
incompleteness- and that non-partisan public employees rendering assistance
should not be precluded from advising the hearing officer. Letter from Alisa Fong,
Deputy General Counsel, League of California Cities, to the California Supreme
Court, (June 27, 2003), available at http://www.cacities.org/recentfilings.htm.
[hereinafter League of Cal. Cities]. Further, making "routine administrative
determinations does not constitute an 'advocacy' function." Id. In Nightlife the
court was unclear on what specific tasks made Boga's initial participation in the
denial prosecutorial in nature. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 248. It suggested that
Boga's position regarding the denial was influential. Id. Perhaps the court was also
convinced by Boga's representation of City in the federal litigation. Further, the
court's discussion on what constitutes prosecutorial or advocacy functions would
have helped clear up the residual uncertainties.
to the decision-maker."'"19 However, the court noted that Howitt did
allow for the combination of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions
under certain circumstances.' 20 The court then recited a hypothetical
from Howitt to emphasize the concern over combining advocacy and
adjudicatory roles.' 21 The hypothetical depicts a hearing at which an
agency' 22 advocate objects during the hearing and then leaves the
council table to advise the hearing officer on whether to sustain her
own objection.' 23 Although the court acknowledged that a different
attorney served as advocate at the time Boga served as advisor, it
made clear that Boga's participation in the review of the denial
violated Nightlife's due process rights.' 24 Boga's advocacy for the
city's position and subsequent advisory role was a sufficient conflict
under this decision. 125 The court analogized Boga's participation to
that of "trial counsel acting as an appellate court's adviser during the
appellate court's review of the propriety of a lower court's judgment
in favor of that counsel's client."' 26  Relying on principles
established in Howitt, the court affirmed the trial court's findings-
119. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245 (citing Howitt, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 204).
120. Id. at 245. In dicta, the Howitt court imagined scenarios where advising
the decision-maker and prosecuting would be allowed. Id at 200. For instance,
two lawyers employed by the same firm could serve in conflicting functions: one
could prosecute the case while the other advised the decision-maker. In this
situation, the court suggested that adequate screening procedures would likely be
required. Id. Language from Howitt left the door open to a degree: "[t]he mere
fact that the decision-maker or its staff is a more active participant in the
factfinding process.. .will not render an administrative procedure unconstitutional."
Id. at 200.
121. Id.
122. In the context of this case, it would be easier to envision "City" instead of
agency because state and federal agencies are subject to APAs that clearly prohibit
the interaction in the hypothetical.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 246.
125. Id.
126. Id. To drive its point home, the court went on to say that "[i]t requires no
citation of authority exactly on all fours with this fact pattern in order to justify the
conclusion that Boga's role as advisor to the decision maker violated petitioner's
right to due process." Id. Interestingly, this analogy is another indication that the
court supports the notion of uniformity in the rules for judicial and administrative
judges. In reality, hearing officers are not held to the same standard as court
judges, making the anecdote less impactful.
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that the participation did in fact violate procedural due process, based
significantly on "a clear appearance of unfairness and bias."' 127
Finally, the court distinguished caselaw presented by City.128
Noting the factual dissimilarity of the cases, the court denied the
applicability of the City's support because the cases did not involve
the same partisan attorney acting in advocacy and advisory roles in
the same matter.1 29 The Nightlife court determined that Boga's
partisan involvement and conflicting roles went beyond that which
was held acceptable in cases presented by City.' 30 Further, the cases
127. Id. (emphasis in original). The court reiterated this fundamental tenet of
the APA in support of finding a due process violation. Id. Further, it offhandedly
conceded a lack of case law directly on point, but justified its holding: "It requires
no citation of authority exactly on all fours to justify the conclusion that Boga's
role as advisor to the decision-maker violated petitioner's right to due process." Id.
This statement reflects the court's recognition of the flexible nature of due process.
128. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 246-49 (citing 12319 Corp. v. Bus.
License Comm'n., 137 Cal. App. 3d 54 (1982)); BreakZone Billiards v. City of
Torrance, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Kloepfer v. Comm'n on
Judicial Performance, 49 Cal. 3d 826, 833 (Cal. 1989).
129. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246. In 12319 Corp. v. Business License
Commission, the advisor to the business license commission did not serve as
advocate for either party during the initial license revocation or the review of the
revocation process. 186 Cal. Rptr. 726. The advisor did at one point assist the
license commission with evidentiary matters in the case; he was instructed to verify
that a sufficient foundation was in place to admit specific evidence favorable to the
defendant. See generally Id. The court determined that helping to examine a
witness did not jeopardize his position as neutral counsel to the commission absent
some showing that other members from county counsel's office were not insulated
from his advisory role. Id. The court ultimately upheld the revocation, primarily
because the plaintiff did not present facts in support of its bias claim and the court
determined that the assistance did not rise to the level of a prosecutorial function.
Id. Incidentally, in Nightlife, the court held that Boga's involvement did rise to the
level of a prosecutorial function which conflicted with his advisory function.
Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247. Addressing these opposing cases would have
been an opportunity for the court to have clearly presented what constituted a
prosecutorial role. In BreakZone Billiards v. City of Torrance, a city attorney
representing the city counsel in the denial of a conditional use permit, did not
create procedural due process concerns because he presented evidence for and
against the denial in a non-partisan manner. 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467. Finally, the
court distinguished Kloepfer v. Commission on Judicial Performance based on a
lack of any alleged combination of advocacy and adjudicatory roles in the same
administrative unit or in the same individual. 49 Cal.3d. 826, 833 (1989).
130. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247-48.
Balancing Administrative Efficiency and Fairness
reflected the presence of insulation between the conflicting functions
and the use of screening measures to prevent unfairness. 131  Yet
another distinction involved a procedural safeguard that prevented
the hearing officer's ruling from being the final decision. 132 Here,
the court points out, no procedural feature prevented the hearing
officer's ruling from being final. 133
The majority opinion' 34 determined that there was substantial
evidence to uphold the trial court's decision to order a new
hearing. 35  The court held that Boga's conflicting advisory and
advocacy roles in the same matter denied the petitioners procedural
due process. 136  The court modified the trial court's ruling by
requiring an additional procedural safeguard: the presiding hearing
officer and advisor in the new proceeding must not have had previous
involvement as City's advocate in this or any factually related
matter. 1 
37
IV. IMPACT
The implications of the Nightlife decision extend far beyond the
facts of this case. A letter from the League of California Cities to the
California Supreme Court, requesting depublication of the Nightlife
opinion, is indicative of the decision's potential impact. 138
Although the outcome of the depublication request remains
131. Id. at 248.
132. Id. In Kloepfer, procedural safeguards were in place to ensure that the
commission's decision was never the final decision. Id. The California Supreme
Court reviewed the commission's recommendation before making the final
determination. Id.
133. Id.
134. Two justices concurred without writing separate opinions, and there were
no dissenting opinions.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 249.
138. The League of California Cities is "an association of all 477 California
cities united in promoting the general welfare of cities and their citizens." League
of Cal. Cities, supra note 118 at n 1. Attorneys from all over the state make up the
Legal Advocacy Committee, a group that "monitors appellate litigation affecting
municipalities and identifies those that are of statewide significance." Id. It singled
out Nightlife as a case of particular interest to those it represents. Id.
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uncertain, the conceivable impact of Nightlife has created a sense of
unease.
A. Nightlife: The New Standard for Due Process Claims
Case law has already reflected the significance of Nightlife as
setting the standard for bias claims based on the combination of
functions. 139 On December 23, 2003, a California appellate court,
relying primarily on Nightlife, held that a prosecuting attorney's
ongoing relationship with the personnel board on other matters was
sufficient to suggest potential bias, despite a lack of showing that the
attorney actually served as an advisor in the case at issue or in any
related matter. 140 This appearance of bias denied the petitioner due
process. 141 The petitioner did not argue that the city attorney advised
the board and advocated for the defendant in the same or related
case. 142  However, the court determined that "the totality of the
circumstances" suggested that the attorney's advisory role in other
matters "create[d] the substantial risk that the Board's judgment in
the case before it w[ould] be skewed in favor of the prosecution.' 43
Essentially, the Quintero court interpreted Nightlife to prohibit the
city advocate from advising or representing the decision-making
body on other matters while appearing before the board as a partisan
advocate for other parties in other cases.144 The Nightlife decision
appears to have sent a message that lax commingling of functions
139. In Quintero v. City of Santa Ana, the court relied primarily on the analysis
of the Nightlife court. See generally Quintero v. City of Santa Ana, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d
896 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. In fact, the court stated that "other interactions with the Board give
the appearance of bias and unfairness and suggest the probability of his influence
on the Board." Id. at 899. Further, "[h]ere, there is no evidence that [the attorney]
acted as both the Board's legal advisor and in a prosecutory function in this case."
Id.
143. Id. at 900. The court conceded that the relationship and contact between
the attorney and the board alone was insufficient to suggest potential for bias but
that the totality of the circumstances and the relationship was created an appearance
of bias. Id.
144. Id.
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across the board will meet with tougher judicial scrutiny. 4 5
Applying the separation of functions doctrine to hearing advisors -
even those not technically serving dual roles in the same proceeding-
146 extended the degree to which a plaintiff can allege due process
violations. Nightlife was the bridge the plaintiffs in Quintero needed
to invalidate a hearing advisor's involvement based on his
involvement with the decision-making board in unrelated cases. 147
B. Financial and Administrative Impact on Local Government
A corollary issue to Quintero is the financial burden local entities
could face because of the potential for increased litigation. Once
considered difficult to obtain, constitutional challenges to local
proceedings might lose their elusiveness: "[t]he [Nightlife] opinion
encourages applicants to file claims against public entities for due
145. Prior to this case, California law was unclear about the scope of the
separation of functions doctrine as applied to hearing advisors at the local level.
KAHN, supra note 4, § 7.2. California Civil Practice referred to the significance of
the precedent Nightlife left behind: "[o]ne thing the courts have made clear is that it
is improper for an agency to allow its "prosecuting attorney" to give legal advice to
the decisionmaker in a given case." Id. This assessment of Nightlife tends to
downplay the scope of the case - even non-prosecuting attorneys are subject to the
separation of functions doctrine. Apparently even those who are not involved in
dual functions in the same or related case may be prevented from advisory roles.
146. Unlike the previous California case on separation of functions, Howitt v.
Superior Court, the advisor in Nightlife served in some capacity as advocate in the
initial denial but not in the proceeding in question or simultaneously while engaged
in an advisory role; Boga was not the prosecuting attorney in the same proceeding
in which he advised. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94. He was involved, as
Assistant City Attorney, in the initial decision which led to the proceeding at issue.
Id. at 86. Some believe that this broad interpretation of the separation of functions
doctrine may lead to confusion and increased litigation. See League of California
Cities, supra note 118. Advocates for the depublishing of Nightlife believe that
"[t]he opinion makes a negative contribution to legal literature by erroneously
characterizing an attorney's routine provision of advice to city staff regarding an
administrative determination as a prosecutorial or 'advocacy' function." Id.
147. Quintero is particularly shocking in light of California's decision to reject
a due process challenge by plaintiffs based on the fact that the presiding hearing
officer "seemed ideologically and financially aligned with one of the parties." See
Asimow, supra note 9. See also Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 171
Cal. Rptr. 590 (Cal. 1981). It seems that due process more closely restrains the
choice of hearing advisors compared to hearing officers.
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process violations."'' 48  Quintero is but one example of a litigant
reaping the benefits of this decision. 149 Petitioners angered by the
local adjudication process have renewed hope as a result of Nightlife,
which begs the question: will this ruling be heralded as rare
protection for plaintiffs, reminiscent of another significant California
case that at least one administrative law scholar predicted could be
depublished? 150
Administrative law professor and scholar Michael Asimow
referred to California's decision in Haas as a rare safeguard for
plaintiffs in local adjudication, adding that "local government
agencies concerned about the case would undoubtedly petition the
Supreme Court to depublish the decision."151 Ultimately, the
California Supreme Court heard the case, eliminating any chance for
local government to request decertification of the opinion. 52 But
Haas is regarded as a shocking decision favoring plaintiffs in
California because, although allowing the County advocate to select
the hearing officer intuitively seems unfair, constitutional challenges
to local procedure rarely succeed. 53 Likewise, in Nightlife, the court
constrained the local government's choice of a hearing advisor,
affording rare protection to the plaintiff. 154 If limitations on selecting
hearing officers seemed controversial post-Haas, the ensuing fear
within local government after Nightlife is only logical. 15 5  The
potential impact of Nightlife has already caused financially strapped
municipalities to take action.
The potential burden on local government in light of this decision
has led representatives for municipalities to request that the
California Supreme Court depublish the Nightlife opinion. 56  Of
particular concern is the belief that the decision will "place an
148. League of Cal. Cities, supra note 118, at 3.
149. Id. "Allowing Nightlife Partners to remain published will turn applicants
into litigants." Id.
150. Asimow, supra note 9. See also Haas, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341.
151. Id.
152. See Haas, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341.
153. KOCH, supra note 10.
154. Nightlife Partners, Ltd. v. City of Beverly Hills, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 234
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
155. See League of Cal. Cities, supra note 118.
156. Id.
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enormous financial burden on and paralyze routine functions of local
governments."' 57  Each day, local governments across California
conduct hundreds of proceedings, typically licensing hearings. 158
Cities have routinely performed these proceedings according to
established ordinance procedures; but Nightlife's narrowing of the
separation of functions doctrine may require thorough review of
these procedures for compliance with the new constitutional
standard.159 Such a review would likely reveal procedural violations:
roughly half of the state's cities have fewer than 25,000 residents,
demonstrating the limited resources and employer pool that lead to
combination of functions scenarios.160 Cities with only part-time or
one full-time city attorney may find themselves with the "logistical
burden of having to screen and coordinate the participation of their
attorneys at different levels of the administrative process to avoid the
appearance of bias."' 161 Although it remains to be seen how many
constitutional challenges will be pursued, it is clear that local
governments may have to prepare for and allocate resources toward
preventing and defending against such claims. Consequently,
California's cities are seeking preventative measures before
revamping their administrative structure: "Decertification from
publication will avoid the expenditure of precious public resources,
and allow local governments to continue to function efficiently
without compromising applicants' constitutional due process rights to
a fair hearing."162
C. Impact on the Administrative Reformist Movement
1. Judicial vs. Administrative Courts: Closing the Gap
The Nightlife decision may lend credibility to the movement
pressing for the use of central panels and uniform codes for judges at
157. Id. at3.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. League of Cal. Cities, supra note 118, at 3.
162. Id.
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all levels. 163 As courts continue to recognize the significant impact
of administrative adjudication on a growing number of citizens,
procedural requirements have become more inflexible and more
similar to the procedures required in judicial courts. In their
decisions, judges even compare the administrative process to their
own process, despite the fact that different rules apply. 164 The gap
between the judicial court system and administrative system may be
drawing closer and closer, case by case.
2. Reliance on the APA
The gap between procedures required under due process and
those required under the APA may be narrowing as well: consider the
Nightlife court's reliance on the APA and the subsequent reliance on
the Act in Quintero.165  The previous California case on the
separation of functions doctrine and due process made no reference
to the Act. 166 Nightlife may have established a new trend in due
process challenges- referring to administrative procedure acts as good
authorities for determining elements of fair procedure-' 67 even
though the Supreme Court already decided that the APA and due
process are separate and distinct. 68 The extent to which the APA is
relied upon to guarantee fairness could ultimately have serious
institutional effects. For instance, the APA requires the use of
administrative law judges- could this be where local adjudication is
163. See Salkin, supra note 101. An article on administrative law reform at the
state and local level highlighted the central panel system as the most promising and
viable administrative reform. Michael Asimow, The Fourth Reform: Introduction
to the Administrative Law Review Symposium on State Administrative Law, 53
Admin. L. Rev. 395, 398-99 (2001) (explaining that the presiding hearing officer
over administrative proceedings is vastly important to millions of people every year
and therefore must be free of bias and independent.) The article left open the
question whether central panels should be applied at the local level but revealed
that the adoption of a central panel system has taken off in many states and large
cities. Id. at 399.
164. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245; Howitt, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 196.
165. Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 243; Quintero, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 896, 898-
901.
166. Howitt, 5 Cal. Rptr. 196.
167. See Nightlife, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 243.
168. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
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headed? If so, administrative law reformists would urge that local
ALJs should fall within the central panel system as well, which
brings us back to the reality of limited resources at the local level. 169
To summarize this point, the ongoing judicial dialogue related to
APA guidelines, judicial codes of ethics, and comparisons of court
and administrative procedures is apparently infectious and strongly
suggests an underlying push for some type of larger administrative
reform.
D. Societal Impact
Expanding due process protections through the judicial process
inevitably leads to a broad societal impact. Increasing protections for
individuals involves tangible effects on municipalities including
labor and other administrative costs. 170 "These costs are collectively
borne." 171  The additional costs must be extracted from the
consistently limited local government budgets, becoming an
"intolerable drain" on the system. 172 The effects trickle down and
ultimately affect some of the very individuals that administrative
units are designed to protect: local citizens, beneficiaries of social
programs, and government employees- to name a few. 173  Yet
increasing protections for citizens legitimizes the process, improves
upon the appearance and guarantee of fairness, and could ultimately
prevent litigation stemming from the unfair combination of functions
in hearings.
169. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 8, at 243.
170. Id. at 191. It seems that notice to local government and clarity in court
decisions would help alleviate the financial strains. If municipalities have a clear
understanding of the requirements, the amount of litigation would likely subside. It
seems that the years of uncertainty in California enabled a system that relied on few
personnel restrictions at the local level.
171. Id.
172. Id. (quoting Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 284 (1970) (Burger,
C.J. dissenting)).
173. Id. at 191.
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V. CONCLUSION
The implications of the California Court of Appeals' decision
in Nightlife reach far beyond the walls of California's cabarets. In
California, due process prevents the overlapping of advisory and
advocacy roles where an appearance of bias is demonstrated. Local
governments across the state must conform to a heightened
constitutional standard in the selection of hearing advisors to ensure
fair process. An increase in litigation often follows an increase in
procedures, and the local administrative system will have to respond
accordingly. Likewise, an increase in cost certainly follows an
increase in litigation, and the financial strain will flow through the
local government system, extracting resources from programs
affecting the lives of every citizen. Fundamentally, this decision
drives home a recurring theme in administrative law: striking a
balance between the competing goals of efficiency and fairness.'
74
The government's interest in effectuating an efficient system will be
compromised to some degree, while the citizens' interest in fairness
will be vindicated. Whether one goal outweighs the other is purely
subjective; but perhaps both parties have gained something. The
aggrieved party has recaptured that fleeting optimism surrounding
fair process, and the local government has another chance to achieve
and restore legitimacy in the eyes of those it serves. If it is true that
protection of the individual "against arbitrary action of government"
is the "'touchstone' of due process," perhaps additional procedural
safeguards require little justification. 175
174. AsiMow, STATE AND FEDERAL, supra note 8, § 2, at 19, § 1.6, at 10.
175. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 8, at 196 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)).
